First, it is a common situation in organizations to have but a few key roles in IT that are the most respected and most consulted. One of these positions is the network administrator. Organizations often find it challenging to obtain competent talent and typically the most talented IT member is the network administrator with everyone else supporting that position. A direct line of commuinication and more intimate relationship with management is usually the result.
There is also a tendency for people with such a key role to mistake a procedural position, executing changes and creating new connections as a result of growth and maintenance when requested, for a more overinflated personality and egotistical sense of entitlement and rock solid job security. Therefore, Terry Childs probably does believe everyone else is incompetent to do “his” job. A non-clinical God complex may be the reality here.
In a jailhouse interview with Paul Venezia, Childs seems to have demonstrated some remorse stating “I’d have gotten out before it came to this. I have a great house, bro, love my house, and I’m on the verge of losing it since I’m in here. I’m out of a job, and don’t know what’ll happen with all this.” I’m not convinced this is remorse. Childs is just unsettled with the consequences. Paul Venezia may be more enamored with Childs convincing presentation of himself and technical superiority.
For whatever Venezia may have accurately represented in terms of security best practices he lost in terms of legal acumen. Venezia described the prosecutions filings as ambiguous and morphing as charges by the prosecution continued to change or morph: “claims would seem to be clear evidence of wrongdoing, but in reality, are common practice in networks the world over”. Often, the prosecution will settle on the charges that will most likely result in a conviction and ignore facts and evidence that indicate an entirely different and even worse crime was committed. Without enough evidence to argue the case the prosecution will simply punt on those charges and focus on the best evidence resulting in charges that have the best chance of conviction.
From the details of the case it appears management intended to never let Childs access the network after that meeting. For reasons we don’t know, the city personnel were “afraid” that Childs would cause potential damage to the network or others. The meeting was probably called to remove access privileges for Childs.
Management at the city IT department seem to have had some concern to dismiss or demote or otherwise move Childs from his role as network administrator. A meeting was scheduled and from the details presented of the attendees is where I suspected the city had some cause for concern that Childs was dangerous. Management seemed more concerned about the potential harm Childs could cause if left in his position rather than the fallout that ensued after this meeting.
Paul Venezia offered as a testament to Childs skill as a network administrator that the network continued to perform flawlessly while it and administrative functions were held hostage. Implying a design so superior that it had no issues as a result. This is more of a testament to Cisco engineering than anything else. The hardware is robust and has low failure rates. Once a network is up and running there can be little to do until a change is requested. So if there were any issues while the network was hostage it is probably on the order of changes requests. He then points to the fact the network experienced its first failure after management of it was finally obtained when the city started changing passwords. This is not unusual especially when you want to change any and all access a network administrator may previously have had.
The following criminal history, at least what we know, indicates a life long problem. At the age of 17 Childs was arrested and convicted of aggravated burglary, and spent four years in a Kansas prison. Again in his late twenties Childs was arrested in Kansas and charged with aggravated assault and carrying a concealed weapon.
All signs point to a network adminstrator that was impressed with himself, developed a so called God complex, expressed behavior and characteristics associated with a cluster of antisocial personality disorders more than an ethical network adminstrator trying to do the right thing.
It is possible that the IT management of San Francisco’s network was trying to do the right thing and remove a hostile employee after identifying him as a threat, and possibly avoiding an incident of workplace violence by not letting Childs sabotage a network if given the chance. The outcome could have been much worse.
